In the case of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria*,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant
provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed of the
Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr F. Gölcüklü,
Mr F. Matscher,
Mr B. Walsh,
Mr R. Macdonald,
Mrs E. Palm,
Mr R. Pekkanen,
Mr J. Makarczyk,
Mr D. Gotchev,
and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr H. Petzold, Deputy
Having deliberated in private on 25 November 1993 and on
20 April and 23 August 1994,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
* Note by the Registrar. The case is numbered 11/1993/406/485. The
first number is the case's position on the list of cases referred to
the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers
indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court
since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating
applications to the Commission.
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European Commission
of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 7 April 1993 and by the
Government of the Austrian Republic ("the Government") on 14 May 1993,
within the three-month time-limit laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and
Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated in
an application (no. 13470/87) against Austria lodged with the
Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) on 6 October 1987 by a private
association with legal personality under Austrian law,
Otto-Preminger-Institut für audiovisuelle Mediengestaltung (OPI).
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48
(art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Austria recognised
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46); the
Government's application referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44,
art. 48). The object of the request and the application was to obtain
a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by
the respondent State of its obligations under Article 10 (art. 10).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with
Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant association
stated that it wished to take part in the proceedings and designated
the lawyer who would represent it (Rule 30).
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio
Mr F. Matscher, the elected judge of Austrian nationality (Article 43
of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the
Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 23 April 1993, in the presence of the
Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other seven
members, namely Mr F. Gölcüklü, Mr B. Walsh, Mr R. Macdonald, Mrs E.
Palm, Mr R. Pekkanen, Mr J. Makarczyk and Mr D. Gotchev (Article 43 in
fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43).
4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), Mr Ryssdal,
acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Government,
the applicant association's representative and the Delegate of the
Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and
38). Pursuant to the orders made in consequence, the Registrar
received the Government's memorial on 24 September 1993 and the
applicant's memorial on 1 October 1993. The Secretary to the
Commission informed the Registrar that the Delegate would submit his
observations at the hearing.
5. On 2 September 1993 the President granted leave to two
non-governmental organisations, "Article 19" and Interights, to submit
written observations on specific aspects of the case (Rule 37 para. 1).
Their observations were received at the registry on 15 October.
6. On 14 October 1993 the Commission produced certain documents
which the Registrar had sought from it on the President's instructions.
7. On 27 October 1993 the Chamber decided under Rule 41 para. 1
to view the film Das Liebeskonzil, as requested by the applicant. A
private showing was held on 23 November 1993.
8. In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing took
place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr W. Okresek, Head of the International
Affairs Division, Department of the
Constitution, Federal Chancellery, Agent,
Mr C. Mayerhofer, Federal Ministry of Justice,
Mr M. Schmidt, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Advisers;
(b) for the Commission
Mr M.P. Pellonpää, Delegate;
(c) for the applicant association
Mr F. Höpfel, Professor of Law at the University
of Innsbruck, Verteidiger in Strafsachen, Counsel.
The Court heard their addresses as well as replies to its
AS TO THE FACTS
I. The particular circumstances of the case
9. The applicant, Otto-Preminger-Institut für audiovisuelle
Mediengestaltung (OPI), is a private association under Austrian law
established in Innsbruck. According to its articles of association,
it is a non-profit-making organisation, its general aim being to
promote creativity, communication and entertainment through the
audiovisual media. Its activities include operating a cinema called
"Cinematograph" in Innsbruck.
10. The applicant association announced a series of six showings,
which would be accessible to the general public, of the film Das
Liebeskonzil ("Council in Heaven") by Werner Schroeter (see
paragraph 22 below). The first of these showings was scheduled for
13 May 1985. All were to take place at 10.00 p.m. except for one
matinée performance on 19 May at 4 p.m.
This announcement was made in an information bulletin
distributed by OPI to its 2,700 members and in various display windows
in Innsbruck including that of the Cinematograph itself. It was worded
"Oskar Panizza's satirical tragedy set in Heaven was
filmed by Schroeter from a performance by the Teatro Belli in
Rome and set in the context of a reconstruction of the
writer's trial and conviction in 1895 for blasphemy. Panizza
starts from the assumption that syphilis was God's punishment
for man's fornication and sinfulness at the time of the
Renaissance, especially at the court of the Borgia Pope
Alexander VI. In Schroeter's film, God's representatives on
Earth carrying the insignia of worldly power closely resemble
the heavenly protagonists.
Trivial imagery and absurdities of the Christian creed are
targeted in a caricatural mode and the relationship between
religious beliefs and worldly mechanisms of oppression is
In addition, the information bulletin carried a statement to
the effect that, in accordance with the Tyrolean Cinemas Act (Tiroler
Lichtspielgesetz), persons under seventeen years of age were prohibited
from seeing the film.
A regional newspaper also announced the title of the film and
the date and place of the showing without giving any particulars as to
11. At the request of the Innsbruck diocese of the Roman Catholic
Church, the public prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings against
OPI's manager, Mr Dietmar Zingl, on 10 May 1985. The charge was
"disparaging religious doctrines" (Herabwürdigung religiöser Lehren),
an act prohibited by section 188 of the Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch -
see paragraph 25 below).
12. On 12 May 1985, after the film had been shown at a private
session in the presence of a duty judge (Journalrichter), the public
prosecutor made an application for its seizure under section 36 of the
Media Act (Mediengesetz - see paragraph 29 below). This application
was granted by the Innsbruck Regional Court (Landesgericht) the same
day. As a result, the public showings announced by OPI, the first of
which had been scheduled for the next day, could not take place.
Those who attended at the time set for the first showing were
treated to a reading of the script and a discussion instead.
As Mr Zingl had returned the film to the distributor, the
"Czerny" company in Vienna, it was in fact seized at the latter's
premises on 11 June 1985.
13. An appeal by Mr Zingl against the seizure order, filed with the
Innsbruck Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht), was dismissed on
30 July 1985. The Court of Appeal considered that artistic freedom was
necessarily limited by the rights of others to freedom of religion and
by the duty of the State to safeguard a society based on order and
tolerance. It further held that indignation was "justified" for the
purposes of section 188 of the Penal Code only if its object was such
as to offend the religious feelings of an average person with normal
religious sensitivity. That condition was fulfilled in the instant
case and forfeiture of the film could be ordered in principle, at least
in "objective proceedings" (see paragraph 28 below). The wholesale
derision of religious feeling outweighed any interest the general
public might have in information or the financial interests of persons
wishing to show the film.
14. On 24 October 1985 the criminal prosecution against Mr Zingl
was discontinued and the case was pursued in the form of "objective
proceedings" under section 33 para. 2 of the Media Act aimed at
suppression of the film.
15. On 10 October 1986 a trial took place before the Innsbruck
Regional Court. The film was again shown in closed session; its
contents were described in detail in the official record of the
Mr Zingl appears in the official record of the hearing as a
witness. He stated that he had sent the film back to the distributor
following the seizure order because he wanted nothing more to do with
It appears from the judgment - which was delivered the same
day - that Mr Zingl was considered to be a "potentially liable
interested party" (Haftungsbeteiligter).
The Regional Court found it to be established that the
distributor of the film had waived its right to be heard and had agreed
to the destruction of its copy of the film.
16. In its judgment the Regional Court ordered the forfeiture of
the film. It held:
"The public projection scheduled for 13 May 1985 of the
film Das Liebeskonzil, in which God the Father is presented
both in image and in text as a senile, impotent idiot, Christ
as a cretin and Mary Mother of God as a wanton lady with a
corresponding manner of expression and in which the Eucharist
is ridiculed, came within the definition of the criminal
offence of disparaging religious precepts as laid down in
section 188 of the Penal Code."
The court's reasoning included the following:
"The conditions of section 188 of the Penal Code are
objectively fulfilled by this portrayal of the divine persons
- God the Father, Mary Mother of God and Jesus Christ are the
central figures in Roman Catholic religious doctrine and
practice, being of the most essential importance, also for the
religious understanding of the believers - as well as by the
above-mentioned expressions concerning the Eucharist, which is
one of the most important mysteries of the Roman Catholic
religion, the more so in view of the general character of the
film as an attack on Christian religions ...
... Article 17a of the Basic Law (Staatsgrundgesetz)
guarantees the freedom of artistic creation and the
publication and teaching of art. The scope of artistic
freedom was broadened (by the introduction of that article) to
the extent that every form of artistic expression is protected
and limitations of artistic freedom are no longer possible by
way of an express legal provision but may only follow from the
limitations inherent in this freedom ... . Artistic freedom
cannot be unlimited. The limitations on artistic freedom are
to be found, firstly, in other basic rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution (such as the freedom of
religion and conscience), secondly, in the need for an ordered
form of human coexistence based on tolerance, and finally in
flagrant and extreme violations of other interests protected
by law (Verletzung anderer rechtlich geschützter Güter), the
specific circumstances having to be weighed up against each
other in each case, taking due account of all relevant
The fact that the conditions of section 188 of the Penal
Code are fulfilled does not automatically mean that the limit
of the artistic freedom guaranteed by Article 17a of the Basic
Law has been reached. However, in view of the above
considerations and the particular gravity in the instant case
- which concerned a film primarily intended to be provocative
and aimed at the Church - of the multiple and sustained
violation of legally protected interests, the basic right of
artistic freedom will in the instant case have to come second.
17. Mr Zingl appealed against the judgment of the Regional Court,
submitting a declaration signed by some 350 persons who protested that
they had been prevented from having free access to a work of art, and
claiming that section 188 of the Penal Code had not been interpreted
in line with the guarantee of freedom of art laid down by Article 17a
of the Basic Law.
The Innsbruck Court of Appeal declared the appeal inadmissible
on 25 March 1987. It found that Mr Zingl had no standing, as he was
not the owner of the copyright of the film. The judgment was notified
to OPI on 7 April 1987.
18. Prompted by the applicant association's lawyer, the then
Minister for Education, Arts and Sports, Dr Hilde Hawlicek, wrote a
private letter to the Attorney General (Generalprokurator) suggesting
the filing of a plea of nullity for safeguarding the law
(Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde zur Wahrung des Gesetzes) with the Supreme
Court (Oberster Gerichtshof). The letter was dated 18 May 1987 and
mentioned, inter alia, Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention.
The Attorney General decided on 26 July 1988 that there were
no grounds for filing such a plea of nullity. The decision mentioned,
inter alia, that the Attorney General's Department (Generalprokuratur)
had long held the view that artistic freedom was limited by other basic
rights and referred to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case
concerning the film Das Gespenst ("The Ghost" - see paragraph 26
below); in the Attorney General's opinion, in that case the Supreme
Court had "at least not disapproved" of that view ("Diese Auffassung
... wurde vom Obersten Gerichtshof ... zumindest nicht mißbilligt").
19. There have been theatre performances of the original play in
Austria since then: in Vienna in November 1991, and in Innsbruck in
October 1992. In Vienna the prosecuting authorities took no action.
In Innsbruck several criminal complaints (Strafanzeigen) were laid by
private persons; preliminary investigations were conducted, following
which the prosecuting authorities decided to discontinue the
II. The film "Das Liebeskonzil"
20. The play on which the film is based was written by Oskar
Panizza and published in 1894. In 1895 Panizza was found guilty by the
Munich Assize Court (Schwurgericht) of "crimes against religion" and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The play was banned in Germany
although it continued in print elsewhere.
21. The play portrays God the Father as old, infirm and
ineffective, Jesus Christ as a "mummy's boy" of low intelligence and
the Virgin Mary, who is obviously in charge, as an unprincipled wanton.
Together they decide that mankind must be punished for its immorality.
They reject the possibility of outright destruction in favour of a form
of punishment which will leave it both "in need of salvation" and
"capable of redemption". Being unable to think of such a punishment
by themselves, they decide to call on the Devil for help.
The Devil suggests the idea of a sexually transmitted
affliction, so that men and women will infect one another without
realising it; he procreates with Salome to produce a daughter who will
spread it among mankind. The symptoms as described by the Devil are
those of syphilis.
As his reward, the Devil claims freedom of thought; Mary says
that she will "think about it". The Devil then dispatches his daughter
to do her work, first among those who represent worldly power, then to
the court of the Pope, to the bishops, to the convents and monasteries
and finally to the common people.
22. The film, directed by Werner Schroeter, was released in 1981.
It begins and ends with scenes purporting to be taken from the trial
of Panizza in 1895. In between, it shows a performance of the play by
the Teatro Belli in Rome. The film portrays the God of the Jewish
religion, the Christian religion and the Islamic religion as an
apparently senile old man prostrating himself before the Devil with
whom he exchanges a deep kiss and calling the Devil his friend. He is
also portrayed as swearing by the Devil. Other scenes show the Virgin
Mary permitting an obscene story to be read to her and the
manifestation of a degree of erotic tension between the Virgin Mary and
the Devil. The adult Jesus Christ is portrayed as a low grade mental
defective and in one scene is shown lasciviously attempting to fondle
and kiss his mother's breasts, which she is shown as permitting. God,
the Virgin Mary and Christ are shown in the film applauding the Devil.
III. Relevant domestic law and practice
23. Religious freedom is guaranteed by Article 14 of the Basic Law,
"(1) Complete freedom of beliefs and conscience is guaranteed
(2) Enjoyment of civil and political rights shall be
independent of religious confessions; however, a religious
confession may not stand in the way of civic duties.
(3) No one shall be compelled to take any church-related
action or to participate in any church-related celebration,
except in pursuance of a power conferred by law on another
person to whose authority he is subject."
24. Artistic freedom is guaranteed by Article 17a of the Basic Law,
"There shall be freedom of artistic creation and of the
publication and teaching of art."
25. Section 188 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
"Whoever, in circumstances where his behaviour is likely
to arouse justified indignation, disparages or insults a
person who, or an object which, is an object of veneration of
a church or religious community established within the
country, or a dogma, a lawful custom or a lawful institution
of such a church or religious community, shall be liable to a
prison sentence of up to six months or a fine of up to
360 daily rates."
26. The leading judgment of the Supreme Court on the relationship
between the above two provisions was delivered after a plea of nullity
for safeguarding the law filed by the Attorney General in a case
concerning forfeiture of the film Das Gespenst ("The Ghost") by
Herbert Achternbusch. Although the plea was dismissed on purely formal
grounds without any decision on the merits, it appeared obliquely from
the judgment that if a work of art impinges on the freedom of religious
worship guaranteed by Article 14 of the Basic Law, that may constitute
an abuse of the freedom of artistic expression and therefore be
contrary to the law (judgment of 19 December 1985, Medien und Recht
(Media and Law) 1986, no. 2, p. 15).
27. A media offence (Medieninhaltsdelikt) is defined as "[a]n act
entailing liability to a judicial penalty, committed through the
content of a publication medium, consisting in a communication or
performance aimed at a relatively large number of persons"
(section 1 para. 12 of the Media Act). Criminal liability for such
offences is determined according to the general penal law, in so far
as it is not derogated from or added to by special provisions of the
Media Act (section 28 of the Media Act).
28. A specific sanction provided for by the Media Act is forfeiture
(Einziehung) of the publication concerned (section 33). Forfeiture may
be ordered in addition to any normal sanction under the Penal Code
(section 33 para. 1).
If prosecution or conviction of any person for a criminal
offence is not possible, forfeiture can also be ordered in separate
so-called "objective" proceedings for the suppression of a publication,
as provided for under section 33 para. 2 of the Media Act, by virtue
"Forfeiture shall be ordered in separate proceedings at
the request of the public prosecutor if a publication in the
media satisfies the objective definition of a criminal offence
and if the prosecution of a particular person cannot be
secured or if conviction of such person is impossible on
grounds precluding punishment ..."
29. The seizure (Beschlagnahme) of a publication pending the
decision on forfeiture may be effected pursuant to section 36 of the
Media Act, which reads:
"1. The court may order the seizure of the copies intended for
distribution to the public of a work published through the
media if it can be assumed that forfeiture will be ordered
under section 33 and if the adverse consequences of such
seizure are not disproportionate to the legitimate interests
served thereby. Seizure may not be effected in any case if
such legitimate interests can also be served by publication of
a notice concerning the criminal proceedings instituted.
2. Seizure presupposes the prior or simultaneous institution
of criminal proceedings or objective proceedings concerning a
media offence and an express application to that effect by the
public prosecutor or the complainant in separate proceedings.
3. The decision ordering seizure shall mention the passage or
part of the published work and the suspected offence having
prompted the seizure ...
30. The general law of criminal procedure applies to the
prosecution of media offences and to objective proceedings. Although
in objective proceedings the owner or publisher of the published work
does not stand accused of any criminal offence, he is treated as a full
party, by virtue of section 41 para. 5, which reads:
"[In criminal proceedings or objective proceedings
concerning a media offence] the media owner (publisher) shall
be summoned to the hearing. He shall have the rights of the
accused; in particular, he shall be entitled to the same
defences as the accused and to appeal against the judgment on
the merits ..."
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
31. The applicant association applied to the Commission on
6 October 1987. It alleged violations of Article 10 (art. 10) of the
32. On 12 April 1991 the Commission declared the application
(no. 13470/87) admissible.
In its report adopted on 14 January 1993 (Article 31)
(art. 31), the Commission expressed the opinion that there had been a
violation of Article 10 (art. 10):
(a) as regards the seizure of the film (nine votes to five);
(b) as regards the forfeiture of the film (thirteen votes to
The full text of the Commission's opinion and of the three
dissenting opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex
to this judgment*.
* Note by the Registrar. For practical reasons this annex will appear
only with the printed version of the judgment (volume 295-A of Series
A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of the Commission's
report is obtainable from the registry.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
33. The Government, in their memorial, requested the Court
"to reject the application as inadmissible under
Article 27 para. 3 (art. 27-3) of the Convention for failure
to observe the six-month rule in Article 26 (art. 26) of the
Convention, or alternatively, to state that there has been no
violation of Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention in
connection with the seizure and subsequent forfeiture of the
34. At the hearing, the applicant asked the Court to
"decide in favour of the applicant association and find
that the seizure and forfeiture of the film were in breach of
the Republic of Austria's obligations arising from Article 10
(art. 10) of the Convention, and that just satisfaction as
specified be afforded to the applicant association".
AS TO THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
35. The Government maintained that the application, which was
introduced on 6 October 1987 (see paragraph 31 above), had been lodged
with the Commission after the expiry of the six-month time-limit laid
down in Article 26 (art. 26) of the Convention, which reads:
"The Commission may only deal with the matter ... within a
period of six months from the date on which the final decision
In the first place, they argued that the applicant association
(OPI) was a "party" only in the proceedings as to the seizure of the
film, not its forfeiture. The final domestic decision was therefore
that of the Innsbruck Court of Appeal confirming the seizure order
(30 July 1985).
In the alternative, the Government pointed out that the
distributor of the film, the "Czerny" company, being the sole holder
of the rights to the only copy of the film, had consented to its
destruction before the first hearing in the "objective proceedings" by
the Innsbruck Regional Court. That court had in fact ordered the
forfeiture of the film on 10 October 1986. The "Czerny" company not
having appealed against that order, the Government argued that it
should be counted the final domestic decision.
Acceptance of either position would mean that the application
was out of time.
A. Whether the Government is estopped from relying on its
36. The Delegate of the Commission suggested that the Government
should be considered estopped from invoking its alternative plea, which
had not been raised before the Commission at the admissibility stage.
In his view, the fact that the Government had pleaded an objection
based on the time-limit of six months laid down in Article 26 (art. 26)
should not be regarded as sufficient, since the argument made then was
based on facts different from those now relied on.
37. The Court takes cognisance of objections of this kind if and
in so far as the respondent State has already raised them sufficiently
clearly before the Commission to the extent that their nature and the
circumstances permitted. This should normally be done at the stage of
the initial examination of admissibility (see, among many other
authorities, the Bricmont v. Belgium judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A
no. 158, p. 27, para. 73).
Although the Government did invoke the six-month rule before
the Commission, they relied only on the judgment of the Innsbruck Court
of Appeal of 30 July 1985. There was nothing to prevent them from
raising their alternative argument at the same time. It follows that
they are estopped from doing so before the Court (see, as the most
recent authority, the Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece judgment
of 24 June 1993, Series A no. 260-B, p. 68, para. 36).
B. Whether the Government's principal plea is well-founded
38. The Government's argument is in effect that OPI is not a
"victim" of the forfeiture of the film, as opposed to its seizure.
39. A person can properly claim to be a "victim" of an interference
with the exercise of his rights under the Convention if he has been
directly affected by the matters allegedly constituting the
interference (see, inter alia and mutatis mutandis, the Norris
v. Ireland judgment of 26 October 1988, Series A no. 142, pp. 15-16,
para. 31, and the Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland judgment
of 29 October 1992, Series A no. 246, p. 22, para. 43).
40. Although the applicant association was not the owner of either
the copyright or the forfeited copy of the film, it was directly
affected by the decision on forfeiture, which had the effect of making
it impossible for it ever to show the film in its cinema in Innsbruck
or, indeed, anywhere in Austria. In addition, the seizure was a
provisional measure the legality of which was confirmed by the decision
on forfeiture; the two cannot be separated. Finally, it is not without
significance that the applicant association's manager appears in the
Regional Court's judgment of 10 October 1986 in the forfeiture
proceedings as a "potentially liable interested party" (see
paragraph 15 above).
The applicant association can therefore validly claim to be a
"victim" of the forfeiture of the film as well as its seizure.
41. It follows from the foregoing that the "final decision" for the
purpose of Article 26 (art. 26) was the judgment given by the Innsbruck
Court of Appeal on 25 March 1987 and notified to OPI on 7 April (see
paragraph 17 above). In accordance with its usual practice, the
Commission decided that the application, which had been lodged within
six months of the latter date, had been filed within the requisite
time-limit. The Government's preliminary objection must accordingly
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 (art. 10)
42. The applicant association submitted that the seizure and
subsequent forfeiture of the film Das Liebeskonzil gave rise to
violations of its right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by
Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention, which provides:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with
it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary."
A. Whether there have been "interferences" with the applicant
association's freedom of expression
43. Although before the Commission the Government had conceded the
existence of an interference with the exercise by the applicant
association of its right to freedom of expression only with respect to
the seizure of the film and although the same point was made in their
preliminary objection (see paragraph 35 above), before the Court it was
no longer in dispute that if the preliminary objection were rejected
both the seizure and the forfeiture constituted such interferences.
Such interferences will entail violation of Article 10
(art. 10) if they do not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 2
(art. 10-2). The Court must therefore examine in turn whether the
interferences were "prescribed by law", whether they pursued an aim
that was legitimate under that paragraph (art. 10-2) and whether they
were "necessary in a democratic society" for the achievement of that
B. Whether the interferences were "prescribed by law"
44. The applicant association denied that the interferences were
"prescribed by law", claiming that section 188 of the Austrian Penal
Code had been wrongly applied. Firstly, it was in its view doubtful
whether a work of art dealing in a satirical way with persons or
objects of religious veneration could ever be regarded as "disparaging
or insulting". Secondly, indignation could not be "justified" in
persons who consented of their own free will to see the film or decided
not to. Thirdly, the right to artistic freedom, as guaranteed by
Article 17a of the Basic Law, had been given insufficient weight.
45. The Court reiterates that it is primarily for the national
authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply national law
(see, as the most recent authority, the Chorherr v. Austria judgment
of 25 August 1993, Series A no. 266-B, p. 36, para. 25).
The Innsbruck courts had to strike a balance between the right
to artistic freedom and the right to respect for religious beliefs as
guaranteed by Article 14 of the Basic Law. The Court, like the
Commission, finds that no grounds have been adduced before it for
holding that Austrian law was wrongly applied.
C. Whether the interferences had a "legitimate aim"
46. The Government maintained that the seizure and forfeiture of
the film were aimed at "the protection of the rights of others",
particularly the right to respect for one's religious feelings, and at
"the prevention of disorder".
47. As the Court pointed out in its judgment in the case of
Kokkinakis v. Greece of 25 May 1993 (Series A no. 260-A, p. 17,
para. 31), freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which is
safeguarded under Article 9 (art. 9) of the Convention, is one of the
foundations of a "democratic society" within the meaning of the
Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital
elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their
conception of life.
Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their
religion, irrespective of whether they do so as members of a religious
majority or a minority, cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all
criticism. They must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their
religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines
hostile to their faith. However, the manner in which religious beliefs
and doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which may engage the
responsibility of the State, notably its responsibility to ensure the
peaceful enjoyment of the right guaranteed under Article 9 (art. 9) to
the holders of those beliefs and doctrines. Indeed, in extreme cases
the effect of particular methods of opposing or denying religious
beliefs can be such as to inhibit those who hold such beliefs from
exercising their freedom to hold and express them.
In the Kokkinakis judgment the Court held, in the context of
Article 9 (art. 9), that a State may legitimately consider it necessary
to take measures aimed at repressing certain forms of conduct,
including the imparting of information and ideas, judged incompatible
with the respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion
of others (ibid., p. 21, para. 48). The respect for the religious
feelings of believers as guaranteed in Article 9 (art. 9) can
legitimately be thought to have been violated by provocative portrayals
of objects of religious veneration; and such portrayals can be regarded
as malicious violation of the spirit of tolerance, which must also be
a feature of democratic society. The Convention is to be read as a
whole and therefore the interpretation and application of Article 10
(art. 10) in the present case must be in harmony with the logic of the
Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, the Klass and Others v. Germany
judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, p. 31, para. 68).
48. The measures complained of were based on section 188 of the
Austrian Penal Code, which is intended to suppress behaviour directed
against objects of religious veneration that is likely to cause
"justified indignation". It follows that their purpose was to protect
the right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings
by the public expression of views of other persons. Considering also
the terms in which the decisions of the Austrian courts were phrased,
the Court accepts that the impugned measures pursued a legitimate aim
under Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2), namely "the protection of the
rights of others".
D. Whether the seizure and the forfeiture were "necessary in a
1. General principles
49. As the Court has consistently held, freedom of expression
constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society,
one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development
of everyone. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2), it is
applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but
also to those that shock, offend or disturb the State or any sector of
the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and
broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic society" (see,
particularly, the Handyside v. the United Kingdom judgment of
7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 23, para. 49).
However, as is borne out by the wording itself of
Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2), whoever exercises the rights and
freedoms enshrined in the first paragraph of that Article (art. 10-1)
undertakes "duties and responsibilities". Amongst them - in the
context of religious opinions and beliefs - may legitimately be
included an obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions that are
gratuitously offensive to others and thus an infringement of their
rights, and which therefore do not contribute to any form of public
debate capable of furthering progress in human affairs.
This being so, as a matter of principle it may be considered
necessary in certain democratic societies to sanction or even prevent
improper attacks on objects of religious veneration, provided always
that any "formality", "condition", "restriction" or "penalty" imposed
be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see the Handyside
judgment referred to above, ibid.).
50. As in the case of "morals" it is not possible to discern
throughout Europe a uniform conception of the significance of religion
in society (see the Müller and Others v. Switzerland judgment of
24 May 1988, Series A no. 133, p. 20, para. 30, and p. 22, para. 35);
even within a single country such conceptions may vary. For that
reason it is not possible to arrive at a comprehensive definition of
what constitutes a permissible interference with the exercise of the
right to freedom of expression where such expression is directed
against the religious feelings of others. A certain margin of
appreciation is therefore to be left to the national authorities in
assessing the existence and extent of the necessity of such
The authorities' margin of appreciation, however, is not
unlimited. It goes hand in hand with Convention supervision, the
scope of which will vary according to the circumstances. In cases such
as the present one, where there has been an interference with the
exercise of the freedoms guaranteed in paragraph 1 of Article 10
(art. 10-1), the supervision must be strict because of the importance
of the freedoms in question. The necessity for any restriction must
be convincingly established (see, as the most recent authority, the
Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria judgment of
24 November 1993, Series A no. 276, p. 15, para. 35).
2. Application of the above principles
51. The film which was seized and forfeited by judgments of the
Austrian courts was based on a theatre play, but the Court is concerned
only with the film production in question.
(a) The seizure
52. The Government defended the seizure of the film in view of its
character as an attack on the Christian religion, especially Roman
Catholicism. They maintained that the placing of the original play in
the setting of its author's trial in 1895 actually served to reinforce
the anti-religious nature of the film, which ended with a violent and
abusive denunciation of what was presented as Catholic morality.
Furthermore, they stressed the role of religion in the everyday
life of the people of Tyrol. The proportion of Roman Catholic
believers among the Austrian population as a whole was already
considerable - 78% - but among Tyroleans it was as high as 87%.
Consequently, at the material time at least, there was a
pressing social need for the preservation of religious peace; it had
been necessary to protect public order against the film and the
Innsbruck courts had not overstepped their margin of appreciation in
53. The applicant association claimed to have acted in a
responsible way aimed at preventing unwarranted offence. It noted that
it had planned to show the film in its cinema, which was accessible to
members of the public only after a fee had been paid; furthermore, its
public consisted on the whole of persons with an interest in
progressive culture. Finally, pursuant to the relevant Tyrolean
legislation in force, persons under seventeen years of age were not to
be admitted to the film. There was therefore no real danger of anyone
being exposed to objectionable material against their wishes.
The Commission agreed with this position in substance.
54. The Court notes first of all that although access to the cinema
to see the film itself was subject to payment of an admission fee and
an age-limit, the film was widely advertised. There was sufficient
public knowledge of the subject-matter and basic contents of the film
to give a clear indication of its nature; for these reasons, the
proposed screening of the film must be considered to have been an
expression sufficiently "public" to cause offence.
55. The issue before the Court involves weighing up the conflicting
interests of the exercise of two fundamental freedoms guaranteed under
the Convention, namely the right of the applicant association to impart
to the public controversial views and, by implication, the right of
interested persons to take cognisance of such views, on the one hand,
and the right of other persons to proper respect for their freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, on the other hand. In so doing,
regard must be had to the margin of appreciation left to the national
authorities, whose duty it is in a democratic society also to consider,
within the limits of their jurisdiction, the interests of society as
56. The Austrian courts, ordering the seizure and subsequently the
forfeiture of the film, held it to be an abusive attack on the Roman
Catholic religion according to the conception of the Tyrolean public.
Their judgments show that they had due regard to the freedom of
artistic expression, which is guaranteed under Article 10 (art. 10) of
the Convention (see the Müller and Others judgment referred to above,
p. 22, para. 33) and for which Article 17a of the Austrian Basic Law
provides specific protection. They did not consider that its merit as
a work of art or as a contribution to public debate in Austrian society
outweighed those features which made it essentially offensive to the
general public within their jurisdiction. The trial courts, after
viewing the film, noted the provocative portrayal of God the Father,
the Virgin Mary and Jesus Christ (see paragraph 16 above). The content
of the film (see paragraph 22 above) cannot be said to be incapable of
grounding the conclusions arrived at by the Austrian courts.
The Court cannot disregard the fact that the Roman Catholic
religion is the religion of the overwhelming majority of Tyroleans.
In seizing the film, the Austrian authorities acted to ensure religious
peace in that region and to prevent that some people should feel the
object of attacks on their religious beliefs in an unwarranted and
offensive manner. It is in the first place for the national
authorities, who are better placed than the international judge, to
assess the need for such a measure in the light of the situation
obtaining locally at a given time. In all the circumstances of the
present case, the Court does not consider that the Austrian authorities
can be regarded as having overstepped their margin of appreciation in
No violation of Article 10 (art. 10) can therefore be found as
far as the seizure is concerned.
(b) The forfeiture
57. The foregoing reasoning also applies to the forfeiture, which
determined the ultimate legality of the seizure and under Austrian law
was the normal sequel thereto.
Article 10 (art. 10) cannot be interpreted as prohibiting the
forfeiture in the public interest of items whose use has lawfully been
adjudged illicit (see the Handyside judgment referred to above, p. 30,
para. 63). Although the forfeiture made it permanently impossible to
show the film anywhere in Austria, the Court considers that the means
employed were not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and
that therefore the national authorities did not exceed their margin of
appreciation in this respect.
There has accordingly been no violation of Article 10 (art. 10)
as regards the forfeiture either.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Holds, unanimously, that the Government are estopped from
relying on their alternative preliminary objection;
2. Rejects, unanimously, the Government's primary preliminary
3. Holds, by six votes to three, that there has been no violation
of Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention as regards either
the seizure or the forfeiture of the film.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 20 September 1994.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 (art. 51-2) of the
Convention and Rule 53 para. 2 of the Rules of Court, the joint
dissenting opinion of Mrs Palm, Mr Pekkanen and Mr Makarczyk is
annexed to the judgment.
Initialled: R. R.
Initialled: H. P.
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES PALM, PEKKANEN AND MAKARCZYK
1. We regret that we are unable to agree with the majority that
there has been no violation of Article 10 (art. 10).
2. The Court is here faced with the necessity of balancing two
apparently conflicting Convention rights against each other. In the
instant case, of course, the rights to be weighed up against each other
are the right to freedom of religion (Article 9) (art. 9), relied on
by the Government, and the right to freedom of expression (Article 10)
(art. 10), relied on by the applicant association. Since the case
concerns restrictions on the latter right, our discussion will centre
on whether these were "necessary in a democratic society" and therefore
permitted by the second paragraph of Article 10 (art. 10-2).
3. As the majority correctly state, echoing the famous passage in
the Handyside v. the United Kingdom judgment (7 December 1976, Series A
no. 24), freedom of expression is a fundamental feature of a
"democratic society"; it is applicable not only to "information" or
"ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as
a matter of indifference, but particularly to those that shock, offend
or disturb the State or any sector of the population. There is no
point in guaranteeing this freedom only as long as it is used in
accordance with accepted opinion.
It follows that the terms of Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2),
within which an interference with the right to freedom of expression
may exceptionally be permitted, must be narrowly interpreted; the
State's margin of appreciation in this field cannot be a wide one.
In particular, it should not be open to the authorities of the
State to decide whether a particular statement is capable of
"contributing to any form of public debate capable of furthering
progress in human affairs"; such a decision cannot but be tainted by
the authorities' idea of "progress".
4. The necessity of a particular interference for achieving a
legitimate aim must be convincingly established (see, as the most
recent authority, the Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria
judgment of 24 November 1993, Series A no. 276, p. 15, para. 35). This
is all the more true in cases such as the present, where the
interference as regards the seizure takes the form of prior restraint
(see, mutatis mutandis, the Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom
judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A no. 216, p. 30, para. 60).
There is a danger that if applied to protect the perceived interests
of a powerful group in society, such prior restraint could be
detrimental to that tolerance on which pluralist democracy depends.
5. The Court has rightly held that those who create, perform,
distribute or exhibit works of art contribute to exchange of ideas and
opinions and to the personal fulfilment of individuals, which is
essential for a democratic society, and that therefore the State is
under an obligation not to encroach unduly on their freedom of
expression (see the Müller and Others v. Switzerland judgment of
24 May 1988, Series A no. 133, p. 22, para. 33). We also accept that,
whether or not any material can be generally considered a work of art,
those who make it available to the public are not for that reason
exempt from their attendant "duties and responsibilities"; the scope
and nature of these depend on the situation and on the means used (see
the Müller and Others judgment referred to above, p. 22, para. 34).
6. The Convention does not, in terms, guarantee a right to
protection of religious feelings. More particularly, such a right
cannot be derived from the right to freedom of religion, which in
effect includes a right to express views critical of the religious
opinions of others.
Nevertheless, it must be accepted that it may be "legitimate"
for the purpose of Article 10 (art. 10) to protect the religious
feelings of certain members of society against criticism and abuse to
some extent; tolerance works both ways and the democratic character of
a society will be affected if violent and abusive attacks on the
reputation of a religious group are allowed. Consequently, it must
also be accepted that it may be "necessary in a democratic society" to
set limits to the public expression of such criticism or abuse. To
this extent, but no further, we can agree with the majority.
7. The duty and the responsibility of a person seeking to avail
himself of his freedom of expression should be to limit, as far as he
can reasonably be expected to, the offence that his statement may cause
to others. Only if he fails to take necessary action, or if such
action is shown to be insufficient, may the State step in.
Even if the need for repressive action is demonstrated, the
measures concerned must be "proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued"; according to the case-law of the Court, which we endorse,
this will generally not be the case if another, less restrictive
solution was available (see, as the most recent authority, the
Informationsverein Lentia and Others judgment referred to above, p. 16,
The need for repressive action amounting to complete prevention
of the exercise of freedom of expression can only be accepted if the
behaviour concerned reaches so high a level of abuse, and comes so
close to a denial of the freedom of religion of others, as to forfeit
for itself the right to be tolerated by society.
8. As regards the need for any State action at all in this case,
we would stress the distinctions between the present case and that of
Müller and Others, in which no violation of Article 10 (art. 10) was
found. Mr Müller's paintings were accessible without restriction to
the public at large, so that they could be - and in fact were - viewed
by persons for whom they were unsuitable.
9. Unlike the paintings by Mr Müller, the film was to have been
shown to a paying audience in an "art cinema" which catered for a
relatively small public with a taste for experimental films. It is
therefore unlikely that the audience would have included persons not
specifically interested in the film.
This audience, moreover, had sufficient opportunity of being
warned beforehand about the nature of the film. Unlike the majority,
we consider that the announcement put out by the applicant association
was intended to provide information about the critical way in which the
film dealt with the Roman Catholic religion; in fact, it did so
sufficiently clearly to enable the religiously sensitive to make an
informed decision to stay away.
It thus appears that there was little likelihood in the instant
case of anyone being confronted with objectionable material
We therefore conclude that the applicant association acted
responsibly in such a way as to limit, as far as it could reasonably
have been expected to, the possible harmful effects of showing the
10. Finally, as was stated by the applicant association and not
denied by the Government, it was illegal under Tyrolean law for the
film to be seen by persons under seventeen years of age and the
announcement put out by the applicant association carried a notice to
Under these circumstances, the danger of the film being seen
by persons for whom it was not suitable by reason of their age can be
The Austrian authorities thus had available to them, and
actually made use of, a possibility less restrictive than seizure of
the film to prevent any unwarranted offence.
11. We do not deny that the showing of the film might have offended
the religious feelings of certain segments of the population in Tyrol.
However, taking into account the measures actually taken by the
applicant association in order to protect those who might be offended
and the protection offered by Austrian legislation to those under
seventeen years of age, we are, on balance, of the opinion that the
seizure and forfeiture of the film in question were not proportionate
to the legitimate aim pursued.